We argue that in the ultimatum game the eects of altruistic behavior and reciprocity vary more in the spectrum of positively compared to negatively-valenced relationships.
Introduction
Based on Gintis (2014) and Kreps (1990) we rst describe the ultimatum game. Two players are given a sum of money and are asked to distribute it between the two of them with player 1 (the proposer, who will be referred to as she) making a distribution proposal and player 2 (the responder, who will be referred to as he) responding to the oer.
If he accepts it, the distribution takes place as proposed by player 1; if he declines, none of the players receives any money. No negotiation or actions of player 2 aecting player's 1 proposal are allowed.
Under the assumptions of rationality, players' materialistic selfishness (strictly increasing preferences over own monetary reward and invariant preferences over the opponent's payo ), perfect and complete information, and perfect divisibility of the total sum of money, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where player 1 oers no money to player 2 and the latter accepts the oer.
1 However, player 1 may not know player's 2 type (incomplete information).
2 More importantly, Güth (1995) underlines that the assumption of perfect rationality is unrealistic and can only be thought of as an as if -explanation. People often rely on what they consider fair or justied and player 2 punishes if player 1 asks for too much often sacricing signicant amounts of money (Güth et al., 1982; Güth and Tietz, 1990) .
In this context, studies have examined how the impact of the sense of fairness on players' actions may vary, while other factors change. It has been argued that increased stakes (larger sum of money distributed) can reduce sensitivity to fairness of player 2 making it more likely that he accepts lower shares of the total sum, thus, giving player 1 the op-1 The perfect divisibility assumption is inessential in the sense that even if the division can only be made in increments, the equilibria of the gamecontrary to experimental evidencestill feature a vast imbalance in the shares the two players receive. Namely, apart from the stated equilibrium there would be one more equilibrium in which player 2 rejects the proposal where he receives nothing and accepts any proposal where he receives a positive amount and player 1 oers one increment of the total sum (e.g., 99 cents go to player 1 and 1 cent to player 2 out of a total of e1).
2 For example, Forsythe et al. (1994) suggest that the ultimatum game can be treated as one, where there are multiple types of players concerned with fairness to varying degrees. Apart from fair players, Slembeck (1999) also documents a large percentage of tough players in his experiments.
portunity to oer a lower share (e.g., Kim et al., 2013; Bechler et al., 2015) . Social distance has also been found to aect fairness considerations (e.g., Homan et al., 1996a; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2002; Andersen et al., 2011; Bechler et al., 2015) .
In the existing literature, social distance commonly varies only from players being close relatives or friends to complete strangers, even though negatively-valenced relationships can be important from an economic point of view. For example, literature has stressed their relevance in organizations and the workplace (Labianca and Brass, 2006; Morrison and Nolan, 2007; Laurence et al., 2018; Venkataramani et al., 2013; Parthasarathy and Forlani, 2016) , networks (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010) , business-to-business relationships (Doney and Cannon, 1997) and consumers' engagement in market-related behavior (Heinonen, 2018) .
Our study aims to ll this gap by introducing negatively-valenced relationships between the players and testing for asymmetries in their behavior, when the relationship is negatively compared to positivelyvalenced. Our survey-based experimental results suggest that in the region of positively-valenced relationships the proposers increase the percentage they oer as relationship quality increases more drastically compared to when the relationship is negatively-valenced, in which case they appear more invariant to relationship eects.
In our experiment, subjects state the strategy that they would follow under a hypothetical situation where they play the game. This way we elicit a minimum acceptable proportion from player 2 and provide clearer results on social distance and stakes eects in the latter's behavior. We nd a negative eect of relationship quality on the minimum percentage acceptable by player 2. This contradicts a strand of the literature (e.g., see Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Shinada et al., 2004) which suggests that cooperation in groups is maintained through punishment of noncooperators, which could entail that selsh behavior of player 1 is more likely to face punishment when the relationship of the players is closer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after this short introduction, section 2 reviews the literature on stakes and social distance eects and section 3 describes the experimental design and presents the hypotheses tested along with the statistical methods employed to test them. Finally, section 4 presents and discusses the results and the last section concludes.
Literature Review
In this section, we rst review the literature on social distance and stakes eects.
3 Next, we provide concepts that can help explain such eects on players' behavior.
Social Distance Eects
One stream of studies on social distance eects focuses on the degree of anonymity. In their dictator game experiments, Homan et al. (1996b) vary the distance-degree of anonymity between the dictator and the experimenterand, presumably, the degree of reciprocity in their relationshipto nd that when a higher degree of anonymity is ensured, players tend to oer less. Charness and Gneezy (2008) report higher portions allocated by dictators, when the latter know the family name of their counterparts. However, in the ultimatum game they trace no such eect explaining that strategic considerations seem to prevail over generosity or charity impulses. In Bolton and Zwick's (1995) ultimatum game experiments, experimenter-subject anonymity can explain part of the deviation from the game-theoretic equilibrium, as 46% of the games under anonymity is in equilibrium opposed to 30% when there is no anonymity.
4 In Eckel and Grossman (1996) , dictators oer more when their counterpart is an established charity versus an anonymous subject.
Another stream of the literature examines social distance eects as a result of relationship closeness. In the studies of Jones and Rachlin (2006) and Rachlin and Jones (2008a) , Rachlin and Jones (2008b) , and Rachlin and Jones (2010) , where social distance varies from 1 (dearest friend) to 100 (mere acquaintance), the lower the social distance between the participants, the larger the amounts of money they are willing to forsake in order for the other player to receive money. In 3 For a broader review of the literature on the ultimatum game, see van Damme et al. (2014) , Güth and Kocher (2014), Camerer (2003) , Bearden (2001), Camerer and Thaler (1995) , Güth (1995) and Güth and Tietz (1990) .
4 However, they nd the punishment hypothesis to explain deviations even better. Kim et al. (2013) player 2 replies to an oer by a hypothetical proposer imagining that he played the ultimatum game (i) for themselves,
(ii) on behalf of their best friend, (iii) on behalf of a stranger. When the recipient is represented in a more distant manner, subjects accept unfair oers more easily due to a more objective perspective induced by increased psychological distance. Bechler et al. (2015) vary social distance between the players (i.e., relative, non-relative, abstract recipient/no specic person in mind) to nd that the proportion oered decreases as social distance increases.
Stakes Eects
Bechler et al. (2015) also research stakes eects to conclude that the proportion of the amount the proposers oer decreases as the size of the total sum distributed increases. Research on these eects is no new to the ultimatum game literature. Tompkinson and Bethwaite (1995) nd that individuals are less concerned with fairness (i.e., relative payos), when the total sum is larger. Andersen et al. (2011) conclude that when stakes are high, player 1 oers lower proportions, while player 2 almost fully converges to full acceptance of low oers, even in the absence of learning (subjects played the game only once). Further studies have documented similar results, although proposers are often found reluctant to decrease the shares they oer as stakes increase (Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005) .
Causes of social distance and stakes eects
Alternate concepts can be employed to explain players' behavior in regard to fairness, social distance and stakes eects: (i) pure preference towards fairness (other-regarding behavior) (Homan et al., 1994; Homan et al., 1996b; Forsythe et al., 1994; Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Nagel, 2001; Rulliére, 2001) , (ii) altruism towards deserving counterparts, identiability and empathy (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2008) , 5 (iii) reciprocity (Homan et al., 1996b; Bohnet and 5 See Schelling (1968) and Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) for an analysis of these concepts. Frey, 1999; Homan et al., 2008; Dhaene and Bouckaert, 2010; Nicklisch and Wol, 2012; Neo et al., 2013) , (iv) strategic considerations possibly regarding repercussions in future interactions between the players (Homan et al., 1994; Forsythe et al., 1994; Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Zamir, 2001; Nagel, 2001; Rulliére, 2001; Charness and Gneezy, 2008) , 6 (v) social concern for reputation (Piazza and Bering, 2008; Vignolo, 2010; Avrahami et al., 2013; Gomaa et al., 2014) and (vi) trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005; Hergueux and Jacquemet, 2015) . Burnham and Johnson (2005) cite the minimum amount he would accept out of the total sum instead of having him respond to a specic oer. Similar procedures have been employed before (Tompkinson and Bethwaite, 1995; Jones and Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin and Jones, 2008a; Rachlin and Jones, 2008b; Rachlin and Jones, 2010; Novakova and Flegr, 2013; Bechler et al., 2015) . Thus, although a limitation is posed by the hypothetical nature of the responses, this aspect of the experimental design also features important advantages. At the same time, we have taken measures to mitigate concerns regarding this limitation (see for example footnote 8).
Experimental Design
The sample consists of 94 people, most of whom were second-year undergraduate students of accounting and nance at the University of Macedonia. Randomly selected students of this second-year class were orally and personally invited to participate after the lectures at the university. Participation in the experiment was voluntary and no one of those invited refused to participate. A concern can be raised from the voluntary nature of subjects' participation. As the number of rounds played by each subject depended on the time constraint of the subject and in the absence of monetary incentives, the more altruistic ones may have been likely to devote more time for the experiments. We address this concern by running some robustness tests described below in subsection 3.3.
At the same time, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) suggest that increased incentives do not substantively aect subjects' average behavior in bargaining games, but they can matter as long as other-regarding behavior and generosity are seen as socially desirable. The fact that no individual of those invited refused to participate can alleviate concerns of a self-selected sample bias caused by the absence of a show-up fee. We conducted the experiments face-to-face with each subject separately.
8 The instructions to the subjects are presented in detail in the Appendix; at this point, we briey describe the procedure.
8 A concern in the literature in this type of games is that lack of subjectexperimenter anonymity could lead to very generous oers due to a potential experimenter eect (e.g., see Homan et al., 1994) . However, the results are mixed. For example, Barmettler et al. (2012) nd that the presence of experimenter-subject anonymity in the dictator game and the ultimatum game only slightly lowers the First, the game was explained to the subject and the subject was randomly assigned the role of the proposer or that of the responder. 11 That is, in the case the subject had been assigned the role of player 1, she was asked to state what allocation (A 1 , A 2 ) of the total sum she would propose, where A i the amount going to player i. When their role was that of player 2, the subject was asked to state the minimum A 2 (min A 2 ) for which he would accept the allocation (A 1 , A 2 ) as a proposal by the person he had brought to mind. The question was repeated for each value of the total sum (i.e., T S = e10, 100, 1, 000, 10, 000, 100, 000, 1, 000, 000). 12
Then, the subject was asked to bring another person (opponent)
oers made by dictators and proposers with the eect being statistically insignicant.
At the same time, the face-to-face approach helps balance the limitations posed by the hypothetical nature of the experiment, as it can ensure a higher quality of responses and better comprehension of the game by the subjects compared to other experimental designs, where the experiment is conducted in written form or through a computer (e.g., as in Tompkinson and Bethwaite, 1995; Jones and Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin and Jones, 2008a; Rachlin and Jones, 2008b; Rachlin and Jones, 2010; Novakova and Flegr, 2013; Bechler et al., 2015) . For example, face-to-face survey respondents have been shown to be less prone to satiscing and respond more properly compared to web or telephone survey respondents thanks to nonverbal communication allowed in face-to-face surveys (e.g., see Krosnick, 1991; Holbrook et al., 2003; Heerwegh and Loosveldt, 2008) . In the conduct of the experiment there were cases where the game and the procedure were explained to the subject a second time, while in a non face-to-face design, the subjects could have proceeded to answer without a rm understanding of what their responses mean.
9 A balance between the number of players 1 and 2 was maintained.
10 In our context, a good, positively-valenced relationship means that the subject gets along with the person they have brought to mind. The relationship is not necessarily related to the frequency of interaction between them. This is especially relevant for negatively-valenced relationships, where the subject and the person they have brought to mind may eschew interaction. The relationship still denotes the attitude towards one another (e.g., a sense of mutual dislike, a feeling of discomfort when interacting or being in the same environment).
11 They could also be asked to answer assuming they played the game with an abstract opponent, a complete stranger (R=0).
12 (A1 and A2) had to be non-negative integers. When T S > e10, they had to be multiples of T S/100.
to mind and the whole procedure was repeated (1-6 times in total).
13 Table 1 presents the number of subjects for whom the procedure was performed 1, 2, . . . , 6 times. One could fear that those who are assigned the role of the proposer are more likely to think of positive relationships compared to negative ones. However, the subjects were guided with respect to what person (i.e., of what relationship quality) they would bring to mind, so that there is a sucient spread for both player 1 and player 2 responses.
14 Table 2 shows the number of opponents against whom the subjects cited their strategy by relationship quality, which conrms that the role assigned is not positively correlated with relationship quality.
15
The mean relationship quality is 2.72 and 3.22
for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
Each session lasted approximately 10 minutes (depending on the number of times the procedure was repeated) and subjects responded verbally. None of the respondents was asked to answer both as player 1 and 2. The sample of 94 subjects multiplied by 6 (for T S = e10 , . . . , 1, 000, 000) and by approximately 3.2 (the average number of opponents each respondent cited their strategy against) generated 1, 806 observations (936 for player 1 and 870 for player 2). 16 Table 1 : Number of subjects asked for 1, 2, . . . , 6 dierent opponents # of opponents 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total # of player 1 subjects 1 12 17 12 4 2 48 # of player 2 subjects 3 4 29 4 5 1 46
Note: for example, 29 of the 46 player 2 subjects were asked for 3 dierent opponents.
13 The procedure was repeated for a (random) number of times/opponents (1 to 6) based on the amount of time the subject was available. Ideally, every subject would participate for the same number of opponents, but this would greatly limit the sample size.
14 To ensure an adequate spread of relationship ratings, we often explicitly asked subjects to bring a person they had a (very) good/bad relationship with. However, subjects were sometimes unable to think of a person for whom R was too low below zero. Thus, although a sucient spread is ensured, there are more cases where R > 0. 15 A simple χ 2 -test for independence using the grouping of 16 The data are available upon request. Note: for example, in total, player 2 subjects replied for 11 opponents of relationship quality -5 or -6.
Hypotheses
Let P O = A 2 T S denote the percentage of T S that player 1 stated she would oer to player 2 and M P A = min A 2 T S the minimum percentage of T S player 2 would accept as an oer by the person he had brought to mind. Hypothesis 3. As R increases (social distance decreases), PO increases.
Hypothesis 4. As R increases (social distance decreases), MPA decreases. Notes: these descriptive statistics are only meant to outline the general behavior of the participants; not to be used for inference, as the mean and median by T S value depend on the specic distribution of R in the sample and vice-versa and those by R sign on the distribution of R itself within the subsample. Thus, we expect social distancerelationship eects to be asymmetric for negative compared to positive relationships; that is, stronger in the latter case.
17 This asymmetry is mainly expected for player 1, as the parameters of social distance discussed above mostly inuence their behavior. However, we also test for asymmetric relationship eects in the behavior of player 2. We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5. When R > 0, ∂P O/∂R is higher compared to when R < 0.
Hypothesis 6. When R > 0, ∂M P A/∂R is lower (higher in absolute value) compared to when R < 0.
Statistical Methods
As our dependent variables P O and M P A assume values in the unit interval [0, 1], we employ beta regression developed by Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) to test our hypotheses.
18 Since the two vari-ables assume the extremes 0 and 1 and the standard beta distribution assumes values only in the open interval (0, 1), we use Smithson and Verkuilen's (2006) transformation (y · (n − 1) + 0.5)/n, where y = P O, M P A and n the sample size. 19 The common logarithm of the total sum is used in the regressions. This log-transformation essentially produces an ordinal variable. The independent variables are described in Table 4 . Apart from estimating separate coecients for R > 0 and R < 0 (using the variables R + and R − ) and testing for equality of the coecients (Wald test), we also use the square of R to test for asymmetries under non-linearity.
20 For player 1 (where the asymmetry is most expected as argued above) a positive and statistically signicant coecient of R 2 will suggest a convex relationship between R and P O; that is ∂P O/∂R will increase with R and thus will be higher for R > 0 compared to R < 0 supporting hypothesis 5. 21
Beta regression allows us to perform tests for the asymmetric effects of hypotheses 5 and 6, which would not be possible under other statistical frameworks.
22 Also, it naturally incorporates features such as heteroskedasticity and skewness, which are inherent in proportion data and especially in the players' behavior. We estimate the models using the betareg package in R developed by Zeileis et al. (2016) . 23 A Cauchy link function is used, as it maximizes the log-likelihood of the dependent dummy variable for whether player 2 accepted the oer or not. See for example Andersen et al. (2011) , where a binary response model is employed.
19 An alternative methodology could be the zero-one-inated beta regression suggested by Ospina and Ferrari (2012) , where the response variable follows a mixed continuousdiscrete distribution with probability mass at zero and one. However, this would rather complicate than facilitate the examination of asymmetric eects, as in this model additional equations (coecients) are estimated for the probability masses at zero and one apart from the equation for the continuous part of the distribution.
20 We test equality of the coecients using the linearHypothesis function of the car package in R; see Fox and Weisberg (2011). 21 The term convex is loosely used and refers to the mean equation, as P O is a nonlinear function of R even for model (1) as shown in Figure 3 to follow. In other words, a positive coecient of R 2 will suggest that ∂P O/∂R increases with R more than it would with a zero coecient of R 
R
Relationship quality between the subject and the opponent they brought to mind {−10, −9, . . . , 10}
R 2 Square of R (not to be confused with the R-squared of the regressions)
{1, 4, 9, . . . , 100}
log T S
Common logarithm of the total sum {1, 2, . . . , 6} models in most cases (see Table 7 in the Appendix).
24 The robustness of the results is tested using the variable dispersion beta regression model employed by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) and formally introduced by Simas et al. (2010) . This model allows for non-linearities and variable dispersion, as the precision parameter is not assumed to be constant in the whole sample, but instead is modeled similarly to the mean parameter. In our case, we allow dispersion to depend on R and log(T S).
To check for misspecication, we use the RESET-inspired diagnostic test employed by Cribari-Neto and Lima (2007 We also test the robustness of our results in subsamples created based on the number of repetitions of the experiment by the subject.
The rst subsample includes the subjects that hypothetically played against up to three people and the second those that reported strategies for four to six opponents, who could be argued as the more al-24 In all player 1 models the Cauchy link yields the highest log-likelihoods often with considerable dierence from the rest. In player 2 models the log-log link yields the highest ones, but only with minimal dierences from the Cauchy.
25 See also Pereira and Cribari-Neto (2014) for misspecication testing in inated beta regressions. truistic ones. These robustness tests have relatively decreased power, as the number of observations for negatively-valenced relationships is decreased after splitting the sample; the second subsample includes a limited number of subjects, as can be seen in Table 1 (16 subjects in the case of player 1 and 10 for player 2).
26
Last, a limitation is posed by the fact that each subject has given multiple responses given that standard beta regression does not account for dependencies in the dependent variable. Thus, we check the robustness of our results in a Generalized Additive Models for Location Scale and Shape (GAMLSS) framework estimating the models including random subject eects in the intercept, R and log(T S) coecients.
27 GAMLSS were introduced by Rigby and Stasinopoulos (2005) , who have also developed the gamlss package in R which we use to estimate these models. Tables 5 and 6 present the estimated models for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Results & Discussion
28 The rst four hypotheses are supported by models (1) in standard and variable dispersion beta regressions for both players.
In player 1 models the log(T S) coecients are all negative and statistically signicant at the 1% level. Similarly, for player 2 they are negative and signicant at the 1% level (in variable dispersion models even more so). R coecients in models (1) for player 1 are positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level, while for player 2 negative and signicant at the 1% or 5% level depending on model specication.
While this result for the eect of social distance on player 2's behavior is in accordance with those by Jones and Rachlin (2006) , Rachlin 26 The split cannot be more balanced as can be seen in Table 1 . 28
The precision parameter equations of the variable dispersion models are available upon request. In these equations, R coecients are signicant in player 1 models, while log(T S) coecients in player 2 models.
and Jones (2008a), Rachlin and Jones (2008b) , and Rachlin and Jones (2010) and Halpern (1992) and Halpern (1994) , it contradicts a strand in the literature which suggests that cooperation in groups is maintained through punishment of group members that do not cooperate (e.g., see Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Shinada et al., 2004) . This could mean that selsh behavior of player 1 is more likely to face punishment from player 2, when their relationship is closerand, thus, they are more likely to mutually belong in a group.
29
Hypothesis 5 is also supported, as the Wald test for equality of the R + and R − coecients in models (2) is rejected at the 1% level. Models (3) show that P O is a convex function of R; ∂P O/∂R is positive and increasing in R and, thus, is higher for R > 0 (see Table 5 ). 30
On the other hand, as expected, hypothesis 6 is not as strongly supported. Although in models (2) the R + coecients are higher (in absolute value) than those for R − , the Wald test for equality cannot be rejected. In models (3) the signs of the R 2 coecients suggest that M P A is a concave function of R as anticipated, but the coecients are not statistically signicant (see Table 6 ).
Figures 3 and 4 present the expected P O and M P A, respectively, as functions of R based on separate standard beta regressions for each value of T S. 31 In Figure 3 we can observe that the asymmetric relationship eects ignored in model (1) are captured in models (2) and (3), especially for higher values of T S. For some values of T S the 29 One could argue that in the region of negatively-valenced relationships, relationship quality and the probability of mutually belonging in a group could be negatively correlated, since in order for a really bad relationship to develop, individuals may need to belong (possibly not by choice) in the same group (e.g., as coworkers).
However, there is still evidence supporting this negative relationship between R and M P A when the latter is tested solely in the spectrum of positively-valenced relationships, where the positive relation between R and reciprocal behavior can hardly be questioned. The corresponding coecient of R + in model (2) in Table 6 is negative and statistically signicant at the 10% level in the standard beta regression and its p-value is close to 10% in the variable dispersion model. 30 ∂P O/∂R = 0 for R ≈ −9.5.
31 The models are as the ones described in Tables 5 and 6 , but with no coecient for log(T S), as the latter remains constant in each separate model. Results of these models are available upon request. Standard beta regressions are selected, as variable dispersion models for player 1 seem to suer from misspecication based on the LR test (see Table 5 ), while for player 2 p-values for misspecication are lower in variable dispersion models as well. Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix present the models estimated in two subsamples for each player: the rst one includes the subjects that answered for playing against up to three opponents and the second those that reported strategies against four to six opponents. In general, the results are robust within subsamples. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are supported in both subsamples, while hypothesis 4 is supported in the rst subsample and not rejected in the second at the 5% level.
Strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 5 is found in the second subsample (at the 1% level), but not in the rst. Last, there is also some evidence in favor of hypothesis 6 in the rst subsample (at the 5% level). However, we should note that the tests in the models estimated in two subsamples have decreased power, as the second subsamples include a limited number of subjectsand especially of observations for negatively-valenced relationships.
Last, our results remain greatly robust under the GAMLSS framework where we take into account the repeated measurements nature of the data. Table 8 in the Appendix presents the results that are analogous to those in the left parts of Tables 5 and 6 .
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we argue that social distance eects in the ultimatum game are asymmetric, since the eects of altruistic behavior and reciprocity can be weaker in the spectrum of negatively-valenced relationships compared to the region of positively-valenced relationships between the players. Such an asymmetry can be reinforced by strategic considerations for future interactions. We experimentally test this hypothesis of asymmetries in social distance eects in the ultimatum game.
In our experimental design, social distance is allowed to vary based on the quality of the players' relationship from −10 to +10with −10 being the worst possible (e.g., an enemy) and +10 the best possible (e.g., a close relative or dear friend). Using a survey based experiment where subjects state the strategy they would follow under a hypotheti- Notes: the black solid line, the red dashed line and the blue dotted line give the expected PO under model 1, 2, 3 specications, respectively; see Table 5 for the models' specication. The expected values for PO in the graphs come from separate beta regressions for each value of TS, so that TS is not included as an exploratory variable in the regressions. Dots are observed PO's. Notes: the black solid line, the red dashed line and the blue dotted line give the expected MPA under model 1, 2, 3 specication, respectively; see Table 6 for the models' specication. The expected values for MPA in the graphs come from separate beta regressions for each value of TS, so that TS is not included as an exploratory variable in the regressions. Dots are observed MPA's.
cal situation where they play the game, we can oer arbitrarily large stakes. At the same time, we elicit a minimum acceptable proportion from player 2 and in this way oer clearer results on social distance and stakes eects in the latter's behavior. In past studies, proposers have often been found reluctant to decrease the shares they oer, as stakes increase (Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cameron, 1999; Munier and Zaharia, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005) , which has created hindrances to the examination of player 2's behavior (Andersen et al., 2011) .
Our experimental results support the following four hypotheses: as the total sum distributed in the game increases, both (i) the percentage oered by player 1 and (ii) the minimum percentage player 2 is willing to accept decrease; the better the relationship between the players (the lower the social distance), (iii) the higher the percentage oered and (iv) the lower the minimum percentage accepted. Similar results have been documented before for player 2 (e.g., Jones and Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin and Jones, 2008a; Rachlin and Jones, 2008b; Rachlin and Jones, 2010; Bechler et al., 2015) . However, the negative eect of relationship quality (positive of social distance) on the minimum percentage accepted by player 2 contradicts a strand of the literature (e.g., see Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Shinada et al., 2004) , based on which cooperation in groups is maintained through punishment of noncooperators.
The latter could mean that selsh behavior of player 1 is more likely to face punishment from player 2 when their relationship is closer, which is not in accordance with our results.
Turning to asymmetric relationship eects, we nd that in the region of positively-valenced relationships (relationship evaluation from subject higher than zero), as relationship quality increases, player 1 increases the percentage she oers more drastically than she does in the region of negatively-valenced relationships. That is, in the negative region player 1 is more invariant to relationship-social distance eects.
The size and signs of the coecients estimated are in agreement with this higher sensitivity to relationship eects in the positive region for player 2 as well, but the results are not statistically signicant in this case. This was partly expected, as the parameters that we argue to cause the asymmetries (i.e., altruistic behavior, reciprocity and strategic considerations) are relevant mostly in regard to player 1's behavior.
Future research could expand on theoretical considerations underlying the asymmetric eects captured in our study. The asymmetries can also be examined in experiments where two subjects play the game with real nancial rewards. Last, in our results, the degree of asymmetry in social distance eects on player 1's behavior seems to vary as the total sum changes. Thus, further research is warranted on the interaction between social distance and stakes eects.
A Appendix
A.1 Instructions to subjects total amount given to you was e100? (and so on till a million e; for T S > e10, the subjects was asked to give answers that were multiples of T S/100) Are you sure about the answers that you gave?
(The procedure described in the paragraph above was repeated with the subject bringing another person to mindexcept if they were asked to answer supposing they played against a strangerand the same set of questions repeated.)
Thank you for your participation. is, supposing the money was real, if you were given a lower amount you would decline and neither of you would receive any money, right?
34 If the total amount given to you was e100? (and so on till a million e; for T S > e10, the subject was asked to give answers that were multiples of T S/100) Are you sure about the answers that you gave?
Thank you for your participation.
A.2 Link function selection and robustness tests
Here we report the log-likelihood for each link function tested for use in the models. Also, we present the models by estimated subsamples based on the number of repetitions of the experiment by the subject. The rst subsample includes the subjects that answered for playing against up to three people and the second those that reported strategies for four to six opponents. Last, we check the robustness of our results in a Generalized Additive Models for Location Scale and Shape (GAMLSS) framework estimating the models including random subject eects in the intercept, R and log(T S) coecients. Note: clog-log stands for complementary log-log. The rst model of up to three repetitions does not converge (the betareg package uses the quasi-Newton BFGS algorithm with analytical rst derivatives to maximize the log-likelihood function). The rst model of up to three repetitions does not converge (the betareg package uses the quasi-Newton BFGS algorithm with analytical rst derivatives to maximize the log-likelihood function).
